Corruption of the Politicized University: Lessons from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
AbstractThis paper argues that corruption is used on a systematic basis as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control from the state level down to local authorities and administrations of public and private institutions. Informal approval of corrupt activities in exchange for loyalty and compliance with the regime is commonplace in many countries. This paper explains how corrupt regimes maximize their position in terms of loyalty and compliance by using the example of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. It presents mechanisms by which political bureaucracies politicize universities in order to influence students and channel their electoral power during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11312.
Date of creation: 30 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
corruption; elections; politicization; students; university; Ukraine;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P36 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2008-11-04 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-EDU-2008-11-04 (Education)
- NEP-TRA-2008-11-04 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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