Economic role of public administration in Central Asia: Decentralization and hybrid political regime
AbstractThe aim of the paper is to understand how the organization of public administration in Central Asia shapes the results of economic development in the region. It discusses the main factors of bad quality of public administration in the region, paying particular attention to the link between political regimes and public administration. Moreover, it provides an overview of decentralization and devolution of power in Central Asian countries as one of the main channels of transformation of administration. The paper covers both formal decentralization and informal distribution of power between levels of government.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 10940.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Public administration; hybrid regimes; decentralization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2008-10-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2008-10-13 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2004.
"Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships,"
w0043, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
- Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 4777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," Economics Working Papers 0053, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp735, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Stark, Manuel & Ahrens, Joachim, 2012. "Economic reform and institutional change in Central Asia: Towards a new model of the developmental state?," PFH Forschungspapiere/Research Papers 2012/05, PFH Private University of Applied Sciences, Göttingen.
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