Uberrimae Fidei and Adverse Selection: the equitable legal judgment of Insurance Contracts
AbstractThis paper examines uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith) with adverse selection in an insurance market. If consumers know their risk type (they know their expected loss), and if they understand the concept of uberrimae fidei, adverse selection is completely eliminated. However, if uberrimae fidei is strictly enforced by the courts, insurers have no incentive to do any underwriting whatsoever. Therefore, whether consumers know their risk type or not, and whether they understand uberrimae fidei, is of paramount importance. If consumers don’t know their risk type or don’t understand uberrimae fidei, then the (equitable) non-strict enforcement (judicial ruling) of contracts of insurance can be efficiency enhancing as it can create an ex-ante incentive for insurers to underwrite. With an ex-ante positive probability that a court may rule equitably in favor of the insured, the insurer engages in underwriting as part of its profit maximization objective, helping insureds to discover their risk type and/or educating potential insureds on the requirements of a contract of uberrimae fidei. This paper therefore contributes a new theory of underwriting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 10874.
Date of creation: 02 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Insurance; Uberrimae Fidei; Utmost Good Faith; Adverse Selection; Contract Theory; Equity; Equitable Law; Institutions; Insurance Cycle;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-10-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2008-10-07 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto ZAZZARO, 2003.
"Should Courts Enforce Credit Contracts Strictly ?,"
181, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
- Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, November.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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