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CEO compensation in high-tech firms and changes in the SFAS No 123 (R)

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  • Paula Faria

    ()
    (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)

  • Franscisco Vitorino Martins

    ()
    (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)

  • Elísio Brandão

    ()
    (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto)

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    Abstract

    This study examines the effects of the introduction of the FASB statement 123 (R) on corporate performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in high-technology firms. The total CEO compensation and short- and long-term compensations were tested regarding corporate performance. Panel data SUR models were estimated that describe total compensation and cash compensation as a proportion of total pay for the period between 2000 and 2010. The findings indicate that there is a positive relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in high-tech firms after the FASB statement 123 (R) is implemented, but with less intensity than before. This econometric study provides a better understanding of the relationship between CEO compensation and performance in high-technologies firms before and after the FASB statement 123 (R).

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    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/wp518.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 518.

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    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:518

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    Keywords: Executive compensation; Corporate finance; FASB statement 123 (R);

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