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Market equilibrium with search and computational costs

Author

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  • Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira

    (Faculdade de Economia do Porto)

Abstract

Although it is an empirical regularity that in the trade of homogeneous goods there is persistent price dispersion and buyers search for low-priced items, theoretically we find that in market equilibrium, when buyers are optimisers (the neo-classical framework), these regularities do not occur. Summing this undesirable theoretical result to the fact that the computation of optimal strategies is demanding, the relevance of using optimisation models in rationalising human behaviour is put in question. Even so, Lucas (1981) claims that optimisation models should not be abandoned because only these are “able to isolate those aspects of behaviour that remain invariant to policy shifts from those that do not”. In this work, following Lucas’ claim, we introduce economic agents as having computational limitations in the neo-classical optimisation model, which is new in the literature. As a result of this alteration to the model, in market equilibrium, we observe both price dispersion and search when buyers have information and computational limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Cosme Costa Vieira, 2005. "Market equilibrium with search and computational costs," FEP Working Papers 173, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:173
    as

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    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/05.04.02_WP173_pedro.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies from the Bottom Up," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Leigh Tesfatsion, 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics," Computational Economics 0203001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Aug 2002.
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    6. Axel, Bo, 1977. " Search Market Equilibrium," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(1), pages 20-40.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Computational limitations; Optimisation; Search; Market equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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