Prospects after the voting reform of the Lisbon Treaty
AbstractThe European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the different demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 1012.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
European Union; Council of Ministers; quali ed majority voting; Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; demographics.;
Other versions of this item:
- Laszlo A. Koczy, 2010. "Prospects after the Voting Reform of the Lisbon Treaty," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1020, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-09-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-09-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-09-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," BeitrÃ¤ge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
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