This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Péter Csóka () (Department of Economics, Maastricht University)
P. Jean-Jacques Herings () (Department of Economics, Maastricht University)
László Á. Kóczy () (Budapest Tech)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We provide two new characterizations of exact games. First, a game is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced; and second, a game is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced. The condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that one of the balancing weights may be negative while for overbalancedness one of the balancing weights is required to be non-positive and no weight is put on the grand coalition. Exact balancedness and overbalancedness are both easy to formulate conditions with a natural game-theoretic interpretation and are shown to be useful in applications. Using exact balancedness we show that exact games are convex for the grand coalition and we provide an alternative proof that the classes of convex and totally exact games coincide. We provide an example of a game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition,but not exact. Finally we relate classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand coalition, exact, totally exact, and convex games to one another.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://bmf.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0805.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: unpublished
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 0805.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision: May 2008
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0805

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1084 Budapest, Tavaszmez� u. 15-17
Phone: +36-1-6665208
Fax: +36-1-6665209
Web page: http://www.kgk.bmf.hu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Zsuzsanna Egervari).

Related research
Keywords: Totally Balanced Games; Exact Games; Convex Games;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hans Reijnierse & Jean Derks, 1998. "Note On the core of a collection of coalitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 451-459. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Biswas, A. K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Potters, J. A. M. & Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Large Cores and Exactness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-12, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1980. "On Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow," Discussion Papers 413, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "On Concavification and Convex Games," Game Theory and Information 0408002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Legut, Jerzy, 1990. "On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 47-60, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2007. "Stable Allocations of Risk," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0704, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1980. "Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced Games," Discussion Papers 425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2007. "Stable Allocations of Risk," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0704, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.