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Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy () (Budapest Tech)

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Abstract

While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

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File URL: http://www.bmf.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0803.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 0803.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision: May 2008
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0803

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Related research
Keywords: Banzhaf index Shapley-Shubik index a priori voting power rational players

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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This page was last updated on 2008-9-22.

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