Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
AbstractWhile they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 0803.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision: May 2008
Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players;
Other versions of this item:
- Kóczy, László Á., 2006. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2008. "Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0820, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-17 (Game Theory)
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- Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
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