Cross-participated firms and welfare
AbstractThe present study analyses the effects on social welfare of the existence of cross-participation at ownership level in a Cournot duopoly. We show that crossparticipation, despite it lowers the degree of competition by reducing total output and consumer surplus, may increases social welfare, provided that i) the firm owned by a single shareholder is less efficient than the other (cross-participated) firm; ii) the size of the market is neither too large nor too small. Therefore, the policy implication is that larger cross-participations at ownership level should be favoured, despite their anticompetitive nature, when the cross-participated firm is more efficient and the extent of the market is not too large.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy in its series Discussion Papers with number 2011/127.
Date of creation: 11 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Cross-ownership; Duopoly; Social welfare.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2007:i:6:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Trivieri, Francesco, 2007. "Does cross-ownership affect competition?: Evidence from the Italian banking industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 79-101, February.
- Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz & Norma Olaizola, 2007. "Cost-saving production technologies and partial ownership," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(6), pages 1-8.
- Rupayan Pal, 2010. "How Much Should You Own? Cross-ownership and Privatization," Working Papers id:2810, eSocialSciences.
- Macho, I. & Verdier, T., 1989.
"Strategic Managerial Incentives and Cross Ownership Structure: A Note,"
DELTA Working Papers
89-02, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Inés Macho-Stadler & Thierry Verdier, 1991. "Strategic managerial incentives and cross ownership structure: A note," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 285-297, October.
- Rupayan Pal, 2012.
"How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization,"
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers
2012-008, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Rupayan Pal, 2010. "How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- David Gilo & Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, 2006. "Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 81-99, 03.
- Alley, Wilson A, 1997. "Partial Ownership Arrangements and Collusion in the Automobile Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 191-205, June.
- Eirik S. Amundsen & Lars Bergman, 2002. "Will Cross-Ownership Re-Establish Market Power in the Nordic Power Market?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 73-95.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.