Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
AbstractThis paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 13-044.
Length: 86 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jun 2013
Date of revision: 11 Aug 2013
commitment; incomplete information; reputation bound; reputation effects; long-run relationships; reputations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-08-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-08-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-08-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-08-23 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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