Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions and Enrollment in the College Market
AbstractI develop and estimate a structural equilibrium model of the college market. Students, having heterogeneous abilities and preferences, make college application decisions, subject to uncertainty and application costs. Colleges, observing only noisy measures of student ability, choose tuition and admissions policies to compete for more able students. Tuition, applications, admissions and enrollment are joint outcomes from a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. I estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, via a three-step procedure to deal with potential multiple equilibria. In counterfactual experiments, I use the model .rst to examine the extent to which college enrollment can be increased by expanding the supply of colleges, and then to assess the importance of various measures of student ability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 12-013.
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
College market; tuition; applications; admissions; enrollment; discrete choice; market equilibrium; multiple equilibria; estimation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2012-04-17 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-LAB-2012-04-17 (Labour Economics)
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