This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Job Search with Bidder Memories

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Carlos Carrillo-Tudela () (Department of Economics, University of Leicester and IZA)
Guido Menzio () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and NBER)
Eric Smith () (Department of Economics, University of Essex and FRB Atlanta)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/09-027.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 09-027.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:09-027

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Email:
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dolly Guarini).

Related research
Keywords: Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gaumont, Damien & Schindler, Martin & Wright, Randall, 2006. "Alternative theories of wage dispersion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 831-848, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Albrecht, James W & Axell, Bo, 1984. "An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(5), pages 824-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. McCall, John J, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-26, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Richard Rogerson & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2005. "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 959-988, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    Other versions:
  9. Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2009. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 14905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Butters, Gerard R, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 465-91, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-73, May.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.