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On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

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Author Info

  • Claus-Jochen Haake

    ()
    (University of Paderborn)

  • Tim Krieger

    ()
    (University of Paderborn)

  • Steffen Minter

    ()
    (University of Paderborn)

Abstract

Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states at the Mediterranean Sea but also more Northern states due to open internal borders and onward migration. Northern member states may free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control. While neither a centralized nor a coordinated policy appears to be feasible, we show that employing an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states, which at the same time must accept the Commission to play this role.

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File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/fiwi/RePEc/pdf/wpaper/WP25.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics in its series Working Papers with number 25.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pdn:wpaper:25

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Web page: http://www.uni-paderborn.de/fakultaeten/wiwi/department4/cie/
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Related research

Keywords: illegal migration; immigration policy; border enforcement; interregional transfers; European Union; expected externality mechanism;

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References

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  1. Maria Concetta Chiuri & Giuseppe De Arcangelis & Angela Maria D’Uggento & Giovanni Ferri, 2007. "FEATURES AND EXPECTATIONS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: results of a field survey in Italy," CHILD Working Papers wp01_07, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  2. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2007. "Immigration amnesties in the southern EU member states - a challenge for the entire EU?," Working Papers 6, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  4. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Grenze zu, Schengen tot
    by Tim Krieger und Steffen Minter in Ökonomenstimme on 2011-05-18 12:00:00
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Cited by:
  1. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
  2. Karin Mayr & Steffen Minter & Tim Krieger, 2009. "Policies on illegal immigration in a federation," Vienna Economics Papers 0909, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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