On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU
AbstractIllegal immigration affects not only EU member states at the Mediterranean Sea but also more Northern states due to open internal borders and onward migration. Northern member states may free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control. While neither a centralized nor a coordinated policy appears to be feasible, we show that employing an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states, which at the same time must accept the Commission to play this role.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics in its series Working Papers with number 25.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.uni-paderborn.de/fakultaeten/wiwi/department4/cie/
More information through EDIRC
illegal migration; immigration policy; border enforcement; interregional transfers; European Union; expected externality mechanism;
Other versions of this item:
- Claus-Jochen Haake & Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2013. "On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 583-612, December.
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2010-03-13 (European Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2010-03-13 (Economics of Human Migration)
- NEP-REG-2010-03-13 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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"Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy,"
33421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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