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The Measurement of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay

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Author Info
Wolfgang Eggert () (University of Paderborn & CESifo)
Alfons Weichenrieder (Goethe University Frankfurt & CESifo)
Jeremy S.S. Edwards (University of Cambridge & CESifo)

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Abstract

This paper uses German evidence to address two questions about corporate governance. The effects of ownership on corporate governance have received much recent attention, but very little of this has been devoted to the appropriate way to measure firm ownership. The results of this paper show that the conclusions reached about the effects of ownership on corporate governance can depend critically on the particular ownership measure used, and that the widely-used weakest-link principle is wholly unsatisfactory as a means of dealing with the issues raised by pyramid ownership structures. The paper also shows that greater ownership concentration typically weakens the link between managerial pay and firm profitability. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis, emphasised in the recent literature on the USA, that large owners are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, such a link.

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File URL: http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/fiwi/RePEc/pdf/wpaper/WP01.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pdn:wpaper:1

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Web page: http://www.uni-paderborn.de/fakultaeten/wiwi/department4/cie/
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Keywords: Firm Ownership Managerial Pay

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are Ceos Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, 2004. "Capital, Labor, and The Firm: A Study of German Codetermination," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 863-905, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Steven N Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0045, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG.
  5. Jeremy Edwards & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2004. "How Weak is the Weakest-Link Principle? On the Measurement of Firm Owners’ Control Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 142-59, April.
  7. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 203-208, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. repec:fth:prinin:430 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Vittoria Cerasi & Sonja Daltung, 2006. "Financial Structure, Managerial Compensation and Monitoring," Working Papers 20061102, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica. [Downloadable!]
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