Price is a Better Climate Commitment
AbstractDeveloping countries justifiably reject meaningful emission targets. This prevents the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for greenhouse gas emissions, and leaves almost all new emissions unpriced. This paper proposes a new pair of commitments—a commitment to a binding carbon-price target and to a Green Fund financed by a form of carbon pricing. The result is global carbon pricing that neither requires developing countries to accept emission caps nor requires industrial countries to accept carbon taxes. The cost of complying with these commitments is subject to far less risk than the cost of an emissions cap, and the combined cost of a $30/ton price target and the Green Fund is only 23 cents per person per day for the United States and is negative for India. The combined advantages should significantly increase the chance that developing countries will commit to a substantial carbon price, and this should increase the chance of cap and trade passing the U.S. Senate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 10pbcc.
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision: 2010
Publication status: Published in The Economists' Voice, 7:1, www.bepress.com/ev/vol7/iss1/art3, February 2010
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
Climate change; carbon pricing; cap and trade; carbon auctions;
Other versions of this item:
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-01-23 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2010-01-23 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-ENE-2010-01-23 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-01-23 (Environmental Economics)
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- Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
- Holtsmark, Bjart & Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2012. "International emissions trading: Good or bad?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 362-364.
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