Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
AbstractWe summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions. The research output includes a congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism. The research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, FAA and DOT executives, airline representatives and other members of the air transportation community. The first simulation placed participants in a stressful, high congestion future scenario and then allowed participants to react and problem solve under various administrative measures and congestion pricing options. The second simulation was a mock slot auction in which participants bid on LGA arrival and departure slots for fictitious airlines.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 07mbac.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Publication status: Published in in Optimal Use of Scarce Airport Capacity, Proceedings of AirNeth Annual Conference, The Hague, April 2007
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
Auctions; airport slot auctions; combinatorial auctions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Crampton & Paul Milgrom, 2004.
"The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,"
03-034, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2004. "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit5, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
- Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004.
"Auctioning Many Divisible Goods,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 480-493, 04/05.
- Peter Cramton, 2009.
"Innovation and Market Design,"
in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 113-137
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vikrant Vaze & Cynthia Barnhart, 2012. "An assessment of the impact of demand management strategies for efficient allocation of airport capacity," International Journal of Revenue Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1/2), pages 5-27.
- Madas, Michael A. & Zografos, Konstantinos G., 2010. "Airport slot allocation: a time for change?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 274-285, August.
- Swaroop, Prem & Zou, Bo & Ball, Michael O. & Hansen, Mark, 2012. "Do more US airports need slot controls? A welfare based approach to determine slot levels," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1239-1259.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Cramton).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.