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Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/cramton-electricity-market-design.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 02emd.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision: 07 Dec 2002
Publication status: Published in Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January, 2003
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02emd

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Electricity Auctions; Market Design;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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Cited by:
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  1. Nielsen, Kurt, 2005. "Auctioning Payment Entitlements," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24566, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.


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