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Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?

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Abstract

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/kahn-cramton-porter-tabors-blue-ribbon-panel-report-to-calpx.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 01calpx.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jan 2001
Date of revision: 27 Jan 2001
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01calpx

Note: Working Paper
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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

Related research

Keywords: Auctions; Electricity Auctions; Multiple Item Auctions;

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Cited by:
  1. Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Supply Function Equilibrium in a Constrained Transmission System," Research Papers 1966, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  2. Abbink, Klaus & Brandts, Jordi & McDaniel, Tanga, 2003. "Asymmetric Demand Information in Uniform and Discriminatory Call Auctions: An Experimental Analysis Motivated by Electricity Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 125-44, March.
  3. Vicki Knoblauch, 2004. "Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working papers 2004-41, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2006.
  4. Elmaghraby, Wedad J., 2005. "Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: Issues of efficiency in electricity auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 166(2), pages 430-448, October.
  5. Luiz T. A. Maurer & Luiz A. Barroso, 2011. "Electricity Auctions : An Overview of Efficient Practices," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2346, January.
  6. Nicholas Shunda, 2005. "Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?," Working papers 2005-48, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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