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Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?

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Author Info
Alfred E. Kahn ()
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)
Robert H. Porter ()
Richard D. Tabors ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Any belief that a shift from uniform to as-bid pricing would provide power purchasers substantial relief from soaring prices is simply mistaken. The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior that would introduce new inefficiencies, weaken competition in new generation, and impede expansion of capacity.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/kahn-cramton-porter-tabors-blue-ribbon-panel-report-to-calpx.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 01calpx.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jan 2001
Date of revision: 27 Jan 2001
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01calpx

Note: Working Paper
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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions Electricity Auctions Multiple Item Auctions

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
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  1. Nicholas Shunda, 2005. "Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?," Working papers 2005-48, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vicki Knoblauch, 2004. "Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working papers 2004-41, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2006. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Tanga McDaniel, 2002. "Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 520.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-13.


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