Political Reservations, Access to Water and Welfare Outcomes: Evidence from Indian Villages
AbstractIn a developing economy with an ethnically diverse society, such as India's, household welfare and its distribution within the household unambiguously depend on how much time each member of the household spends on productive activity. In this paper we examine the welfare impact of reducing the time spent by members of households, particularly women, through political reservations in rural India. Using a unique data set we find that (i) Political reservations and the ability of women to participate in the process of governance contribute to household welfare by allowing women to participate in labor markets, essentially because provision of public goods and in particular water, increases the productivity of household labor time. (ii) The concomitant decline in household work and increase in labor market participation is a robust indicator of increased productivity of household labor time being translated into productive work. In particular women participate in self employment and on cultivation. The effect on household incomes caused by members engaged in self-employment activities and own-cultivation is higher compared to effects caused by participation in off-farm wage labor. (iii) Further, our results are robust to the inclusion of residential location, access to credit, and shocks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre in its series ASARC Working Papers with number 2011-15.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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Political Reservations for Women; Water; Time in Unproductive Activity; IV estimation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- C26 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-HME-2011-11-01 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-LAB-2011-11-01 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-11-01 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2011. "Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership? The Case of U.S. Mayors," NBER Working Papers 17671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Guillaume R. Frhette & Franis Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2007.
"Incumbents' interests and gender quotas,"
0708-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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