Institutions and co-ordination costs
AbstractEconomic literature sees the existence of institutions as being justified by market failure. This paper attempts to develop a different hypothesis by linking institutions to the solution of co-ordination dilemmas. According to this line of thought, institutional action is not circumscribed to the supplying of ‘regulative resources’ able to lower uncertainty and limiting the risks of free riding. It includes rather the provision of a vast set of public goods characterised by high complementarity and marked constraints on the continuity of supply. In the production of such goods, the presence of multiplicity of equilibria and high costs of information born by individual agents in formulating a cooperative agreement often makes a decentralised decision-making process impracticable. On the other hand, as we try to show, a central authority (an institutional subject), assuming long term obligations and lowering co-ordination costs, can mitigate collective action problems in a wide range of circumstances
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy) in its series Economics Department Working Papers with number 2000-EP07.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- A. Arrighetti & G. Seravalli & G. Wolleb, 2001. "Social Capital, Institutions and Collective Action Between Firms," Economics Department Working Papers 2001-EP08, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
- A. Arrighetti & S. Curatolo, 2010. "Costi di coordinamento e vantaggi di aggregazione: esiti, morfologia e processi di interazione in un mondo artificiale multi-agente," Economics Department Working Papers 2010-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Andrea Lasagni).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.