Are Workers Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional?
AbstractOne of the reasons why workers'enterprises (WE) still represent a relevant chunk of the economy may lay in some affinities with conventional profit maximizing firms. To provide a solid basis to this presumption, we compare the entry policies of WEs and conventional firms when size is set at entry and kept fixed afterwards. Even though short run differences remain between WEs and conventional firms, a long run coincidence appears in an uncertain dynamic environment. Endogenizing size and time of entry we see that the two kinds of firms enter at the same trigger market price and size. Both of them enter earlier and choose a dimension larger than the minimum efficient scale. This generalised coincidence may be another way to explain why WEs still make for an important share of the economy (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007) despite the ongoing mantra of their imminent demise.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number 0066.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Workers' enterprises; entry; uncertainty; rigidity;
Other versions of this item:
- Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 2008. "Are Workers' Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 22(2), pages 369-381, 06.
- Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 2007. "Are Workers. Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional," Working Papers 2007.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- M. Moretto & G. Rossini, 2007. "Are Workers' Enterprises entry policies conventional?," Working Papers 582, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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