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It's a Small World After All: The Convergence of Disclosure Practices Across Legal Regimes over Time

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Author Info
Timothy Fogarty (Case Western Reserve University)
Garen Markarian (Bocconi University)
Antonio Parbonetti () (University of Padua)
Abstract

The literature on disclosure practices has posited a relationship between legal regime and the amount of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, companies in nations with a civil law tradition were expected to make more voluntary disclosure to compensate for the information that would otherwise be required in common law nations. This expectation was predicted on the assumptions that investors in the former nation would have salient information needs such that the proprietary costs of information production would be overcome. Data collected from 75 firms across the world were used to support the finding that the extent of difference across legal regimes is diminishing over time.

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Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number 0014.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0014

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  5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Christine A. Botosan, 2002. "A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 21-40, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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