Refunds and Collusion
AbstractWe characterize the conditions under which industry-wide agreements on refund policies weaken price competition. We identify the conditions under which joint industry proffit increases with the amount of refunds promised to those consumers who cancel a reservation or return a product. We compare it to similar industry configurations when firms set up shipping and handling charges instead of refunds. Finally, we investigate refund policies under moral hazard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number 0001.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Refunds; Partial refunds; Collusion on refunds; Shipping & handling charges; Moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-10-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2005-10-29 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2005-10-29 (Microeconomics)
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