Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Using interlocks as a corporate strategy: a descriptive analysis of the Spanish case

Contents:

Author Info

  • Santiago Kopoboru

    ()
    (PhD Candidate. Department of Business Organization and Marketing, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Organizations may use a number of different strategies to survive, grow, and achieve success. One of the possible strategies is the use of social capital, in particular interlocks by boards of directors, as their benefits can range from political advantages to better access to information. Despite the increasingly importance of social networks, they have received little attention by scholars when analyzing Spanish corporate boards. This paper pretends to fulfill some of this gap by analyzing interlocks of the largest firms in the Spanish stock exchange in the years 2004 and 2009. The main contribution of this study will relate to a better understanding of the mechanisms used by corporate boards to increase the competitiveness of organizations which in turn changes the network previously created. The analysis will be twofold: First, we are concerned with particular features of the network, that is, its structure and its evolution to understand the development of the network. Second, we are concerned with the board and its composition which explain network’s structure. The results show the network large Spanish firms create had minor modifications after the five year period. Also, board size and board composition seem to be variables determinant of firm’s degree centrality in the network, being outsiders in the board those who provide post of the interlocks the firm has. Surprisingly, the Spanish network does not have banks as major players at its core anymore, which is contrary to resource dependence theory since links with banks are an important resource for both, the firm, which may have access to better loans; and the bank, which reduces its monitoring costs.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Business Organization and Marketing (former Department of Business Administration) in its series Working Papers with number 13.01.

    as in new window
    Length: 37 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:pab:wpboam:13.01

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Carretera de Utrera km.1, 41013 Sevilla
    Phone: + 34 954 34 9866
    Fax: + 34 954 34 8353
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.upo.es/doem/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: interlocks; corporate government; Spain; social capital;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    2. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2008. "Boards: Does one size fit all," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 329-356, February.
    3. Renée Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2008. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," NBER Working Papers 14486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. William B. Stevenson & Robert F. Radin, 2009. "Social Capital and Social Influence on the Board of Directors," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 16-44, 01.
    5. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2008. "Social Networks and Corporate Governance," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(4), pages 633-662.
    6. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58.
    7. Boone, Audra L. & Casares Field, Laura & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Raheja, Charu G., 2007. "The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 66-101, July.
    8. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, 04.
    9. Geoffrey C. Kiel & Gavin J. Nicholson, 2003. "Board Composition and Corporate Performance: how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 189-205, 07.
    10. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, 06.
    11. Cesare Fracassi & Geoffrey Tate, 2012. "External Networking and Internal Firm Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 153-194, 02.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pab:wpboam:13.01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publicación Digital - UPO).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.