Intra-National Protectionism in China: Evidence from the Public Disclosure of 'Illegal' Drug Advertising
AbstractThis paper provides micro-level evidence that drug advertising regulations and inspections in China are used by local governments to discriminate against firms from outside the province.� Furthermore, the degree of discrimination varies across firms in that drug manufacturers which have closer ties with rival provinces are more likely to be targeted.� These findings demonstrate that giving provincial governments strong incentives to compete with each other may exacerbate the market distortions inherent in a partially reformed economy such as China.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/2013-07.
Date of creation: 17 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
China; intra-national protectionism; drug advertising;
Other versions of this item:
- Markus Eberhardt & Zheng Wang & Zhihong Yu, 2013. "Intra-National Protectionism in China: Evidence from the Public Disclosure of ‘Illegal’ Drug Advertising," Discussion Papers 2013-04, University of Nottingham, GEP.
- Markus Eberhardt & Zheng Wang & Zhihong Yu, 2013. "Intra-National Protectionism in China: Evidence from the Public Disclosure of ‘Illegal’ Drug Advertising," CSAE Working Paper Series 2013-07, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2013-06-09 (Development)
- NEP-TRA-2013-06-09 (Transition Economics)
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