Media Freedom and Democracy: Complements or Substitutes in the Fight against Corruption?
AbstractDemocracy and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which predicts that the corruption-reducing effect of democracy becomes stronger as media freedom increases. Using panel data covering the period 1980-2008 and 126 countries, we find empirical support for this prediction. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. The complementarity between democracy and media freedom in the fight against corruption is also supported by Indian state level data.�
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/2012-02.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Corruption; Political institutions; Democracy; Media freedom;
Other versions of this item:
- Sambit Bhattacharyya & Roland Hodler, 2012. "Media Freedom and Democracy: Complements or Substitutes in the Fight against Corruption?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-02, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-02-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CUL-2013-02-03 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-02-03 (Positive Political Economics)
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