Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability
AbstractUsing a specially designed lab-type experiment conducted in the field, we compare the willingness of head teachers, centrally appointed public servants, and community representatives to hold Ugandan primary school teachers to account.� We find no difference in the willingness of centrally appointed public servants and community representatives.� However, head teachers are significantly less willing to punish teachers whose performance falls 20 to 40 percent below a generally accepted benchmark.� In addition, head teachers are twice as liklely to punish teachers who "over-perform", a behaviour akin to punishing rate-busters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/2011-13.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Public service; Education; Experiments; Africa; Accountability; Methodology;
Other versions of this item:
- Abigail Barr & Andrew Zeitlin, 2011. "Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability," CSAE Working Paper Series 2011-13, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- I29 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Other
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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