Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: An experimental investigation
AbstractAn economic experiment involving separate sessions in 24 small, tightly knit communities reveals that trust is higher where greater trustworthiness is expected and lower variance in levels of trustworthiness is perceived. A model in which potential trusters behaviour is likened to a risky investment explains nearly fifty percent of the variation in their behaviour between communities. The predicted relationships continue to exist following the introduction of an additional, important variable relating to resettlement into the model, although the precise forms of the relationships vary between different types of community. The 24 communities are all Zimbabwean, 18 resettled and 6 not.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/2001-12.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
trust; trustworthiness; field experiment; Zimbabwe; resettlement;
Other versions of this item:
- Abigail Barr, 2001. "Trust and expected trustworthiness: an experimental investigation," CSAE Working Paper Series 2001-12, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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