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Familiarity and trust: an experimental investigation

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  • Abigail Barr

Abstract

In Zimbabwe, people in resettled villages trust each other less than people in non-resettled villages. This does not appear to be due to differences in socially transmitted rules of behaviour. Further, there are good reasons to believe that it is not due to the self-selection of a particular type of person into resettlement. Rather, the variations appear to be due simply to a lack of familiarity and to the consequentially greater uncertainty faced by resettled villagers when trying to predict each other’s behaviour in strategic situations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/1999-23.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 1999
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/1999-23

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  1. W. Guth & R. Tietz, 2010. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of results," Levine's Working Paper Archive 295, David K. Levine.
  2. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  3. Edward L. Glaeser & David Laibson & Jose A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 1999. "What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness," NBER Working Papers 7216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
  5. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  6. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Fabio Sabatini & Angelo Antoci & Mauro Sodini, 2009. "The Fragility of Social Capital," Working Papers 2009.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Lutz, Eva & Mayer, Judith & Spiess-Knafl, Wolfgang, 2011. "Disentangeling gut feeling: Assessing the integrity of social entrepreneurs," CEFS Working Paper Series 2011-03, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technische Universität München.
  4. Alesina, Alberto F & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2000. "Who Trusts Others?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2646, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Tanaka, Tomomi & Camerer, Colin & Nguyen, Quang, 2009. "Measuring Norms of Redistributive Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam," MPRA Paper 16119, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Carter, Michael R. & Castillo, Marco, 2003. "An Experimental Approach to Social Capital in South Africa," Staff Paper Series 448, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics.
  7. Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa R. Anderson, 2005. "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Inequality and Relative Deprivation on Trusting Behavior," Working Papers 0502, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  8. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2005. "Experiments and Economic Development: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0505, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  9. MICHAEL R. CARTER & Marco Castillo, 2002. "The Economic Impacts of Altruism, Trust and Reciprocity: An Experimental Approach to Social Capital," Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 448, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
  10. Tomomi Tanaka & Colin F Camerer & Quang Nguyen, 2006. "Poverty, politics, and preferences: Field Experiments and survey data from Vietnam," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001099, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Social Capital and Development," Economics Series Working Papers 214, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Tomomi Tanaka & Colin F. Camerer & Quang Nguyen, 2006. "Preferences, Poverty and Politics: Experimental and Survey Data from Vietnam," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000054, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. William Heller & K. Sieberg, 2008. "Functional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 399-413, June.

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