Dictator games in the lab and in nature: External validity tested and investigated in Ugandan primary schools
AbstractThis paper tests the external validity of a simple Dictator Game as a laboratory analogue for a naturally occurring policy-relevant decision-making context.� In Uganda, where teacher absenteeism is a problem, primary school teachers' allocations to parents in a Dictator Game are positively but weakly correlated with their time allocations to teaching and, so, negatively correlated with their absenteeism.� Guided by a simple theoretical model, we find that the correlation can be improved by allowing for (a) variations in behavioural reference points across teachers and schools and (b) the positive effect of some School Management Committees on teacher attendance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number CSAE WPS/2010-11.
Date of creation: 01 May 2010
Date of revision:
Public service; education; experiments; Africa; external validity; methodology;
Other versions of this item:
- Abigail Barr & Andrew Zeitlin, 2010. "Dictator games in the lab and in nature: External validity tested and investigated in Ugandan primary schools," CSAE Working Paper Series 2010-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- I29 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Other
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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- Yann Girard & Florian Hett, 2013. "Competitiveness in dynamic group contests: Evidence from combined field and lab data," Working Papers 1303, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Apr 2013.
- Abigail Barr & Andrew Zeitlin, 2011.
"Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability,"
CSAE Working Paper Series
2011-13, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Abigail Barr & Andrew Zeitlin, 2011. "Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2011-13, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Bezu, Sosina & Holden, Stein T., 2013. "Generosity and social distance in dictator game field experiments with and without a face," CLTS Working Papers 1/13, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
- Abigail Barr & Lawrence Bategeka & Madina Guloba & Ibrahim Kasirye & Frederick Mugisha & Pieter Serneels & Andrew Zeitlin, 2012. "Management and Motivation in Ugandan Primary Schools: An impact evaluation report," Working Papers PIERI 2012-14, PEP-PIERI.
- Axel Franzen & Sonja Pointner, 2013. "The external validity of giving in the dictator game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 155-169, June.
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