Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Colonial Army
AbstractAs formalized by Montgomery (1991), referral by employees improves efficiency if the unobserved quality of a new worker is higher than that of unrefereed workers.� Using data compiled by army archives, we test whether the referral system in use in the British colonial army in Ghana served to improve the unobserved quality of new recruits.� We find that it did not: referred recruits were more likely than unreferred recruits to desert or be dismissed as 'inefficient' or 'unfit'.� We find instead evidence of referee opportunism.� The fact that referred recruits have better observed characteristics at the time of recruitment suggests that army recruiters may have been aware of this problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number CSAE WPS/2009-10.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Marcel Fafchamps & Alexander Moradi, 2009. "Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Colonial Army," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Fafchamps, Marcel & Moradi, Alexander, 2009. "Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Colonial Army," CEPR Discussion Papers 7408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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