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Implicationsof Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk-Sharing

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Author Info
Tessa Bold
Abstract

This paper models the implications of endogenous group formation for efficient risk-sharing contracts in the dynamic limited commitment model. Endogenising group formation requires that any risk-sharing arrangement is not only stable with respect to individual deviations but also with respect to deviations by sub-groups. This requirement alters the central predictions of the dynamic limited commitment model for efficient bilateral risk-sharing. Firstly, consumption of constrained agents depends on the previous history of shocks and the interaction of the history of shocks with the current income realizations of other constrained agents. As a consequence, the efficient contract does not display amnesia. Secondly, the covariance between current consumption and past income can take on negative values. Based on the first result, we derive a formal test for the presence of endogenous group formation under limited commitment. In addition, we show how this test can be extended to distinguish a limited commitment/perfect information environment from a full commitment/imperfect information environment empirically.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 387.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:387

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Related research
Keywords: Risk-Sharing; Limited Commitment; Endogenous Group Formation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. De Weerdt, Joachim & Dercon, Stefan, 2006. "Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 337-356, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Dubois, P., 2005. "Heterogeneity of preferences, limited commitment and coalitions : empirical evidence on the limits to risk sharing in rural Pakistan," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200505, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Group Formation in Risk--Sharing Arrangements," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(1), pages 87-113, January.
  4. Marcet, A. & Marimon, R., 1998. "Recursive Contracts," Economics Working Papers eco98/37, European University Institute.
    Other versions:
  5. Attanasio, Orazio & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 2000. "Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1225-1258, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Thorsten Koeppl, 2004. "Differentiability of the Efficient Frontier when Commitment to Risk Sharing is Limited," Working Papers 1049, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(1), pages 209-44, January.
  8. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Judd, Kenneth L., 1992. "Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 410-452, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2007. "Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(3), pages 857-895, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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