Learning by Trial and Error

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Learning by Trial and Error

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H. Peyton Young

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H. Peyton Young

Abstract

A person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. We introduce a learning rule in which behavior is condition on whether a player experiences an error of the first or second type. This rule, called interactive trial and error learning, implements Nash equilibrium behavior in any game with generic payoffs and at least one pure Nash equilibrium.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 384.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:384

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
NEP-CBA-2008-03-25 (Central Banking)
NEP-CBE-2008-03-25 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
NEP-EVO-2008-03-25 (Evolutionary Economics)
NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)

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Mónica C. Capra, 2004. "Mood-Driven Behavior in Strategic Interactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 367-372, May. [Downloadable!]
Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2006. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 286-303, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp371, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2004. "Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000466, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp459, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Peyton Young, 2002. "Learning Hypothesis Testing and Nash Equilibrium," Economics Working Paper Archive 474, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Germano, Fabrizio & Lugosi, Gabor, 2007. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Karandikar, R. & Mokherjee, D. & Ray, D. & Vega-Redondo, F., 1996. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Papers 96-06, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2006. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 341-367, September. [Downloadable!]
Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2001. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000. [Downloadable!]
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptative Strategies," Economics Working Papers 373, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Kirchsteiger, G. & Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A., 2000. "Your morals are your moods," Discussion Paper 122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Georg Kirchsteiger, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini., 2001. "Your Morals Are Your Moods," Economics Working Papers E01-294Rev, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2001. "Your Morals Are Your Moods," Game Theory and Information 0012005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2001. "Your Morals Are Your Moods," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1018, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Smith, Kip & Dickhaut, John, 2005. "Economics and emotion: Institutions matter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 316-335, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December. [Downloadable!]
Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
Other versions:
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997. [Downloadable!]
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996. [Downloadable!]
Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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