A person is concerned about self-image if his utility function depends, not only on his actions, but also on his beliefs about what sort of person he is. This dual motivation problem makes it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for someone to learn who he really is based solely on his revealed behavior. Indeed, there are very simple situations, involving just two actions and two possible identities, such that, if there is any initial uncertainty about one's true identity, it will never be resolved even when one has an infinite number of opportunities to act.
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
383.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,"
Working Papers
137, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
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