Financial Liberalisation and Capital Regulation in Open Economies
AbstractWe model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalising bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by reducing the average size and efficiency of the banking sector. This effect can be countered by forcing international harmonisation of capital requirements across economies, a policy reminiscent of the level playing field adopted in the 1988 Basle Accord. Such a policy is good for weaker regulators whereas a laissez faire policy under which each country chooses its own capital requirement is better for the higher quality regulator. We find that imposing a level playing field among countries is globally optimal provided regulatorsÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ abilities are not too different. We also show how shocks will be transmitted differently across the two policy regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 2004-FE-10.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Bank regulation; capital; multinational banks; exchange controls; international financial regulation; level playing field.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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- Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
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