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Step-by-Step Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

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  • Thomas Norman

Abstract

This paper considers the extension of Ellison`s (2000) Radius-Modified Coradius Theorem from the uniform-mutations case to a general stochastic setting. A modified theorem is presented, with a crucial role now played by the most probable evolutionary paths between states. The form of such paths is liable to change outside of the uniform mutations case, with concomitant effects on both long-run selection and expected waiting times. An algorithm for finding these paths is offered, and used to demonstrate the continued optimality of step-by-step evolution.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2003/W8/Steps.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 2003-W08.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:2003-w08

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  1. Lee, In Ho & Szeidl, Adam & Valentinyi, Akos, 2000. "Contagion and state dependent mutations," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0027, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Thomas Norman, 2003. "The Evolution of Coordination under Inertia," Economics Papers 2003-W06, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  3. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  4. J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
  5. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002. "Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents," Economics Series Working Papers 89, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1995. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," NBER Working Papers 5291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  8. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  9. repec:fth:iniesr:501 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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