Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments
AbstractThis paper is empirical study, using new experimental data, of repeated game strategies in trust games; its goal is to identify strategies that people use in repeated games. We develop a strategy inference method that maps observed actions to a set of best fitting unobserved repeated game stategies. Data analysis shows the ability of the method to infer distinct but intuitive and theoretically justified sets of strategies across finitely an indefinitely repeated games. In indefinitely repeated trust games we infer trigger strategies that are consistent with equilibria. In finitely repeated games we infer strategies with end-game effects. Almost all strategies inferred are best responses to the inferred strategies of opponents. For the first time we hypothesize repeated game strategies based on observed behavior, and characterize observed behavior using the core game theory concept of repeated-game strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 2001-W13.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Game Theory; Empirical Methods; Experimental Economics; Repeated Games; Trust;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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- Pedro Dal B�, 2005.
"Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games,"
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American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
- Pedro Dal Bó, 2002. "Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2002-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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