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Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory

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  • Paul Klemperer

Abstract

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful argument and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 2000-W25.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:2000-w25

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Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Auction Theory; Private Values; Common Values; Mechanism Design; Litigation; Stock Markets; Queues; Financial Crashes; Brand Loyalty; War of Attrition; Bertrand; Perfect Competition; E-Commerce; Spectrum Auctions; Treasury Auctions; Electricity;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gaudeul, Alexia, 2009. "A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students," MPRA Paper 15388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2001. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Nov 2001.
  3. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, 03.
  4. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 2002-W20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Boone, J., 2003. "'Be nice, unless it pays to fight': A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2003-011, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  6. Ali Hortacsu & Steven L. Puller, 2005. "Understanding Strategic Bidding in Restructured Electricity Markets: A Case Study of ERCOT," NBER Working Papers 11123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Economics Series Working Papers 2000-W26, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Uður Emek, 2002. "The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0209001, EconWPA.
  9. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  10. Daniel A. Benitez, 2004. "On Quantity Competition and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings, Econometric Society 98, Econometric Society.
  11. Stenborg, Markku, 2003. "Waiting for F/OSS: Coordinating the Production of Free/Open Source Software," Discussion Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 884, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.

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