The Evolution of Collective Action
AbstractA public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing play. With symmetric players, success depends upon the cost of contribution, the benefit from provision, and the critical team-size m; the relative variability of costs and benefits, and their correlation, are also critical. When players differ, successful teams consist of either the most efficient contributors, or those with the most idiosyncratic preferences. The addition of a single bad apple (for instance, an individual whose costs are particularly variable) to a population in which a successful team operates may result in destabilisation: over time, the bad apple might supplant an existing contributor, prompting a collapse.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 190.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Collective Action; Evolution; Teams; Equilibrium Selection; Exponential Cost; Rooted Trees.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2006-03-18 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2006-03-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2006-03-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-03-18 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Blume Lawrence E., 1995.
"The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 111-145, November.
- Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994.
- Maria Manuela Castro Silva, 2006. "Collective Action-A Challenge and an Opportunity for Water Governance," ERSA conference papers ersa06p659, European Regional Science Association.
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