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Trust Responsiveness and Beliefs

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Author Info
Gerardo A. Guerra
Daniel John Zizzo

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Abstract

Trust responsiveness is the tendency to fulfill trust because you believe that it has been placed on you. The experiment presented in this paper uses two simple trust games to measure directly or indirectly the robustness of trust responsiveness in three conditions: when beliefs are elicited and a summary of these beliefs is transmitted; when beliefs are elicited but not transmitted, when beliefs are not elicited. Insofar as we can tell, trust responsiveness is robust to our belief manipulations: this strengthens the case for the real-world significance of trust responsiveness. Shame provides a possible explanation for unexpected trusters` choices.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 099.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:099

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Keywords: trust trust responsiveness belief elicitation shame

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

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  2. Bjørnskov, Christian, 2007. "Social trust and the growth of schooling," Working Papers 07-6, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Emanuele Ciriolo, 2005. "Inequity aversion and trustees’ reciprocity in the trust game," Working Papers DULBEA 05-20.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab," ISLA Working Papers 27, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Friedel Bolle & Jessica Kaehler, 2006. "Coleman's Hypothesis on trusting behaviour and a remark on meta-studies," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 469-483, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2006. "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 005, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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