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Is Trust Self-Fulfilling? An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Michael Bacharach
Gerardo A. Guerra
Daniel John Zizzo

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Abstract

A person is said to be `trust responsive` if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to disentangle it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need, and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster`s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee`s belief about the truster`s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. We find evidence of strong trust responsiveness. We also find that perceptions of kindness and of need increase trust responsiveness, and that perceptions of kindness and need raise fulfilling rates only in conjunction with trust responsiveness.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 076.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:076

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Related research
Keywords: trust game experiment trust responsiveness kindness need to trust belief elicitation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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  1. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Gueth, 2001. "The Psychological Game of Trust," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, . "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Farina, Francesco & O'Higgins, Niall & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2008. "Eliciting Motives for Trust and Reciprocity by Attitudinal and Behavioural Measures," IZA Discussion Papers 3584, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ryan Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James Parco, 2006. "The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 147-166, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vittorio Pelligra, 2004. "How to incentive Who? Intra-personal and inter-personal mechanisms," Working Paper CRENoS 200404, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2004. "Experimenter bias across gender differences," Department of Economics University of Siena 438, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2006. "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 005, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  10. Vittorio Pelligra, 2005. "Banking with sentiments. A model of fiduciary interactions in micro-credit programs," Working Paper CRENoS 200503, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
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