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Group Selection and the Evolution of Altruism

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Author Info
Ben Cooper
Chris Wallace

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Abstract

`Group selection` is often cited as an explanation for the survival of altruism. The idea of group selection is a controversial one - much effort has been expended on its justification (and refutation). Relatively little effort has gone into formally testing whether or not it can actually provide a reasonable explanation for altruistic behaviour. This paper concentrates solely on whether or not a group structure enables the survival of altruism in an evolving population. If altruism is to flourish either groups need to be isolated from each other for multiple generations, or groups themselves need to be constructed in a positively assortative manner. In the former case the size of the group, the relative benefit to cost of altruism and the number of generations in isolation play a crucial role in determining the survival chances of altruism. In the latter case, when groups are short-lived phenomena, a precise condition is given on the assortative mechanism for the survival of altruism in the long run. The probability distribution of the dispersion-rematching process and the group size are of critical importance in this case.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 067.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:067

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Related research
Keywords: altruism group selection evolution assortative matching dispersion

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

Cited by:
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  1. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.


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