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Currency Boards and Currency Crises

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Author Info
Gregor Irwin
Abstract

This paper demonstrates how a currency board can become vulnerable to a crises in which the policymaker is forced to devalue. The model is built from two blocks: first, incomplete information about the devaluation cost faced by the policymaker; and second, unemployment persistence. Incomplete information can result in multiple equilibria. In one class of equilibrium the policymaker has a credibility problem and maintaining the currency board is costly in terms of unemployment. If unemployment is persistent then pressure to devalue can build up over time until it becomes unbearable and the policymaker is forced to devalue.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 065.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:065

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Keywords: currency boards; crises;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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  1. Drazen, Allan & Masson, Paul R, 1994. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Esteban Jadresic & Paul R. Masson & Paolo Mauro & Michael Mussa & Alexander K. Swoboda & Andrew Berg, 2000. "Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy," IMF Occasional Papers 193, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  4. Charles Enoch & Tomás J. T. Baliño, 1997. "Currency Board Arrangements: Issues and Experiences," IMF Occasional Papers 151, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Collins, Susan M., 1996. "On becoming more flexible: Exchange rate regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 117-138, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Maurice Obstfeld, 1997. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Eduardo Borensztein & Andrew Berg, 2000. "The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization," IMF Working Papers 00/50, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Amadou N. R. Sy & Luis Rivera-Batiz, 2000. "Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior," IMF Working Papers 00/97, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Holger C. Wolf, 2000. "Currency boards: More than a quick fix?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 269-335, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Eichengreen, B. & Masson, P. & Savastano, M. & Sharma, S., 1999. "Transition Strategies and Nominal Anchors on the Road to Greater Exchange-Rate Flexibility," Princeton Essays in International Economics 213, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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