This paper presents a model of school choice with peer effects and scale economies within schools. Parents` perception of school quality depends on resources and on the characteristics of the student body. A network of local schools of uniform quality will be optimal, even though different households prefer different qualities. Whether schools of different qualities emerge depends on the strength of peer effects. If peer effects are strong there will be an incentive for existing schools to select for ability and for new selective schools - state funded and private - to enter. To discourage bifurcation of the school system into different qualities, peer effects could be weakened, say by grouping students by ability within schools (`setting`, `streaming` or `tracking`).
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
050.
Find related papers by JEL classification: I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out R53 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock