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Could Reputation-Bias be a Bigger Problem than Inflation-Bias?

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James Forder

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Abstract

The theory of policy credibility has been influential in both the design of monetary policymaking institutions and in the implementation of policy. In particular, the idea that `reputation` is important has been widely accepted. However, careful attention to its assumptions and implications of the theory reveals many sources of doubt as to its empirical value. First, the theory is implausible, and even if taken seriously does not point to many of the conclusions frequently supposed to be based on it. Second, evidence suggests the theory is false. Third, even policymakers who profess themselves concerned about the maintenance of credibility do not behave consistently in the way the theory says they should. Although many policy proposals ostensibly based on the theory of credibility therefore seem to lack persuasive support, the idea of credibility still poses a danger to effective policymaking since it creates motives for excessively contractionary policy. Although it is frequently asserted that monetary policy can have no long-term effects on economic performance, the idea that a loss of `reputation` will have lasting detrimental effects appears to motivate much policy. In the absence of convincing arguments that reputation - in its technical sense - is important, this would seem to be undesirable and probably dangerous.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 022.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:022

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Keywords: central bank independence policy credibility deflation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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  3. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Friedman, Milton, 1977. "Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 451-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-59, July.
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  7. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Alesina, Alberto & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 663-88, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Goodhart, Charles A E & Huang, Haizhou, 1998. "Time Inconsistency in a Model with Lags, Persistence, and Overlapping Wage Contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 378-96, July.
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