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• Paul Klemperer

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 001.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:001

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Keywords: auctions; bidding; auction theory; private values; common values; mechanism design; litigation; stock markets; queues; financial crashes; brand loyalty; War of Attrition; Bertrand; perfect competition; E-commerce; spectrum auctions; treasury auctions; electricity;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Professor Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Microeconomics 0004008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. Wolfgang Leininger, 2000. "Auction Theory from an All-Pay View: Buying Binary Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper Vries, de, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
   • Baye, M.R. & Kovenock D. & De Vries, C.G., 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1137, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Isabelle Brocas, 2003. "Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 125-149, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. H. Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1999. "Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing?," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
6. Wolfgang Leininger, 2000. "Auction Theory from an All-Pay View: Buying Binary Lotteries," Discussion Papers in Economics 00_06, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
8. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-103/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.