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Applying Auction Theory to Economics

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Author Info
Paul Klemperer

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Abstract

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 001.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:001

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Related research
Keywords: auctions bidding auction theory private values common values mechanism design litigation stock markets queues financial crashes brand loyalty War of Attrition Bertrand perfect competition E-commerce spectrum auctions treasury auctions electricity

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Cited by:
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  1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. H. Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1999. "Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing?," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfgang Leininger, 2000. "Auction Theory from an All-Pay View: Buying Binary Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  4. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock D. & De Vries, C.G., 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1137, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Wolfgang Leininger, 2000. "Auction Theory from an All-Pay View: Buying Binary Lotteries," Discussion Papers in Economics 00_06, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.

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