Design of a Social Security System: Pension System vs. Unemployment Insurance
AbstractThis paper presents consideration of how the social security system evolves as the attributes of voters change. In our setting, policy determination is based on majority voting. The government has two components of social security policy: a pension system and unemployment insurance. When workers constitute most voters, the pension system is supported and when unemployed people are the majority, unemployment insurance is adopted. Under this setting, employing the concept of structure-induced equilibrium developed by Shepsle (1979), the present paper describes how the contents of the social security system evolve depending on the dynamics of capital accumulation and the unemployment rate, and demonstrates the possibility that one or the other social security system ceases to exist in certain instances.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 11-12.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Social Security; Pension System vs. Unemployment Insurance; Majority Voting; Structureinduced equilibrium.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2011-04-09 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-04-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-IAS-2011-04-09 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2011-04-09 (Macroeconomics)
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