An Experimental Test of a Collective Search Model
AbstractThis paper's objectives are to design laboratory experiments of finite and infinite sequen- tial collective search models and to test some implications obtained in the model of Albrecht, Anderson and Vroman (2010) (the AAV model). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the average search duration is longer in collective search with the unanimity rule, but it is shorter in the case of collective search in which at least one vote is needed to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in collective search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in the case of collective search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, a different outcome is obtained from the AAV model in terms of the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in collective search for the various plurality voting rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 11-06.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
experiment; collective search; voting rule.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-03-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2011-03-05 (Experimental Economics)
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