Coordination Behavior and Optimal Committee Size
AbstractHow many members should committees consist of? This paper addresses this question in view of imperfect information and coordination behavior among the members, which is a new approach alternative to introducing information acquisition cost. First, using a simple model, I show that the existence of the coordination motive dismisses Condorcetfs (1785) suggestion and the finite optimal size of the committee is determined. Second, I provide an application of the mechanism to monetary policy committees in a basic New Keynesian model. This example will inspire other applications to policy issues in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 10-02.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
committee; Condorcet jury theorem; coordination; higher order beliefs monetary policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2010-02-13 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2010-02-13 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2010-02-13 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
- Maurin, Vincent & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2012. "Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules," Working Paper Series 1434, European Central Bank.
- Tim Aldridge & Amy Wood, 2014. "Monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures: some cross-country comparisons," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-30, March.
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