Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Bond Financing: Evidence from Japan
AbstractThis paper investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects corporate bond financing. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that firms with controlling shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms. The results show that managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders has an influential impact on corporate bond financing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 09-10.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Managerial entrenchment; Large corporate shareholders; Corporate bonds;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-04-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2009-04-05 (Corporate Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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